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The value of employer-provided health insurance is excluded from an individu- 
al’s federal and state taxable income and from the social security tax base. 
These exclusions provide an incentive for individuals and firms to structure 
compensation arrangements so that employees receive employer-provided in- 
surance, rather than cash compensation that they may ultimately use to finance 
their health care or health insurance purchases. This incentive has important 
economic implications: medical care financed by insurance will generally be 
overconsumed because of low copayment rates under traditional insurance pol- 
icies. Tax incentives for employer provision of health insurance have therefore 
been cited, for example by Feldstein (1973), Pauly (1986), and Phelps (1992), 
as encouraging overinsurance and ultimately overconsumption of medical ser- 
vices. 
Given the central role of this tax incentive in the medical economy, it is 
important both to measure it and to analyze how it would be affected by vari- 
ous policy reforms. This task is a complicated one because the tax system 
subsidizes medical care purchases in two ways. The first is the exclusion from 
income and payroll taxes of all employer insurance premium payments, as well 
as some fraction of employee payments for employer-sponsored insurance. The 
second  is the deductibility  of  individual expenditures on medical  care and 
medical insurance that exceed some minimum threshold, currently 7.5 percent 
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of adjusted gross income (AGI). The net tax incentive for insurance purchase 
depends on the subsidy for employer-provided insurance relative to that for 
health care purchase if  an individual self-insures. Most previous analyses of 
the tax incentive for employer-provided health insurance have focused only on 
the first tax incentive. 
This paper  presents  new  evidence  on the net  tax  subsidy  to  employer- 
provided health insurance, as well as new estimates of the likely effects of 
various tax policy reforms. We do so by combining information from the 1987 
National Medical Expenditures Survey (NMES) with data from the U.S.  Trea- 
sury Individual Tax Model file to estimate how the tax system affects the after- 
tax price of  health insurance relative to the after-tax price of  out-of-pocket 
health care spending. We aggregate respondents in the NMES into health in- 
surance units then use the NBER TAXSIM model to estimate the tax saving to 
each from employer provision of health insurance. Our procedure preserves 
the rich cross-sectional variation in household spending on medical care better 
than approaches that impute insurance and medical care outlays to households 
in other data sets. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 5.1, we sketch the analytical 
framework that we use to measure the net tax subsidy to employer-provided 
health insurance. We define the tax subsidies to employer-provided insurance, 
employer-sponsored insurance that is paid for by  the employee, and out-of- 
pocket spending on health insurance and health care. We then measure the net 
tax price of employer-provided insurance as a function of these subsidies. Sec- 
tion 5.2 describes the data sets we analyze and outlines our algorithm for mea- 
suring the tax subsidies. 
Section 5.3 reports the basic results of our analysis. We begin by providing 
estimates of  the marginal subsidy to additional insurance purchases since this 
is the margin of overinsurance of  most concern to health policy analysts. We 
then describe the recent evolution of this subsidy. We compare the period be- 
fore the Tax  Reform Act of  1986 (TRA86), when the top marginal tax rate 
under the personal income tax was 50 percent, to the late 198Os, when the 1986 
tax rate reductions were fully phased in, and to 1994, after several increases in 
marginal tax rates had brought top marginal tax rates to nearly 40 percent. We 
thereby illustrate how changes in the tax structure can affect the magnitude of 
the tax subsidy to employer-provided health insurance. 
Section 5.4  describes the effect of various tax policy reforms on the net tax 
subsidy to health insurance purchase and reports illustrative calculations  of 
how such reforms might affect the demand for health insurance. We consider 
capping the value of  insurance benefits that are exempt from federal income 
taxation, as well as including the full value of employer-provided health insur- 
ance in both the FICA and federal income tax bases. We describe how these 
changes would affect the marginal subsidies to employer-provided health in- 
surance, and under plausible assumptions about the price elasticity of demand 
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mand. Although there is no definitive empirical evidence on the price elasticity 
of demand for health insurance, we present calculations using several values 
spanning results in the existing literature. Section 5.5 summarizes our findings 
and outlines several directions for future research. 
5.1  Tax Subsidy to Employer-Provided Health Insurance 
Employer-provided insurance is one of many ways of financing medical care 
services. It is therefore important to distinguish between subsidies to the pur- 
chase of health insurance and subsidies to the consumption of health care more 
generally. A change in the after-tax price of insurance can alter the financing 
of any given set of medical services, and since it changes the composite price 
of medical care, it may also affect the level of health care services consumed.' 
Our analysis is limited to the former effect, the impact of taxation on the fi- 
nancing of medical care. We  assume that changes in the level of  employer- 
provided health insurance would be offset by  similar changes in household 
out-of-pocket  spending, with little or no change in the level of  health  care 
consumed. We therefore understate the effect of tax reforms on the demand for 
health insurance since shifts in the aggregate demand for medical care would 
reinforce changes in the level of insurance demand following a tax reform. 
We define the tax subsidy to insurance purchase in terms of the relative after- 
tax price of financing health care with insurance, and without insurance on an 
out-of-pocket basis. Our approach does not consider how the tax subsidy to 
employer-provided insurance affects the after-tax price of medical care, which 
prevents us from analyzing how insurance tax reforms would affect aggregate 
medical care spending.2 
The current U.S.  tax system subsidizes both employer-provided health insur- 
ance and out-of-pocket medical spending. Employees with employer-provided 
health insurance are not required to include the value of this insurance in their 
taxable income for federal and state income taxation, or in their wage tax base 
for the payroll tax.3 The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that in fiscal 
1994, federal revenues from the personal  income tax and payroll tax were 
nearly $90 billion lower as a result of these exclusions (U.S. Congressional 
Budget Office [CBO] 1994a). The tax system also subsidizes out-of-pocket 
1. This distinction parallels  a familiar  analysis in  the taxation of  corporate  capital income. 
Changing the tax treatment of debt would lead both to a shift in financing, it.,  differential use of 
debt and equity, as well as a shift in the ultimate level of real investment. 
2. The after-tax price of medical care at the time of consumption depends on whether the patient 
is insured, the copayment rate and deductible level for the patient's health insurance (if insured), 
and whether the patient itemizes tax deductions and claims the medical expense deduction. For 
those who purchase insurance, there is also an ex ante price of medical care, distinct from the 
price at the time of consumption, that includes the price of purchasing insurance. 
3. Employer-provided health insurance was encouraged by  the 1942 Stabilization Act, which 
placed limits on wage increases but allowed employers to offer insurance plans to their employees. 
Scofea (1994) provides an introduction to the history of employer-provided health insurance in 
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spending on health  insurance and medical services by allowing an itemized 
deduction for medical expenses. Itemizers can deduct expenditures on medical 
care and directly purchased health insurance in excess of 7.5 percent of AGI 
from their federal taxable income. The revenue cost of this provision, less than 
$4 billion in 1994, is much smaller than that for employer-provided insurance. 
Our definition of the tax subsidy to employer-provided insurance considers 
both the after-tax cost of employer-provided insurance and the after-tax cost of 
out-of-pocket medical  spending. We  do not consider individually purchased 
health insurance, on the grounds that higher load factors and less-favorable tax 
treatment than for employer-provided insurance make this a dominated option 
for those who seek insurance. 
5.1.  I  After-Tax Cost of Employer-Provided Insurance 
We consider an individual with a federal marginal income tax rate on earned 
income of T,  a net-of-federal-tax state income tax rate of T,, and employer and 
employee rates of payroll tax each equal to T~~.  We assume that labor income 
taxes and payroll  taxes are fully borne by  labor, so that when  an employer 
provides  insurance that costs E dollars, the employee’s wage  is reduced  by 
El(1 + 7J4 The employer is indifferent between purchasing $1 of insurance 
or paying wages of  1/(1 + T,,),  since each dollar of wages requires a payroll 
tax payment as well. The change in the employee’s after-tax wage income per 
dollar of employer-provided insurance, dw,ldE,  is therefore 
dw,  1 -  T -  T, -  T,,  - 
dE  1 + 7,s 
Many previous studies of taxation and employer-provided health insurance, 
including Feldstein and Allison (1974), Taylor and Wilensky (1983), Holmer 
(1984),  and Burman and Williams (1994), have used dw,/dE  or some variant 
of it to define the tax subsidy to employer-provided insurance. A parallel as- 
sumption is made in the literature on taxation and the demand for fringe bene- 
fits more generall~.~ 
While the reduction in after-tax wages per dollar of employer-provided  in- 
surance is a key factor determining the after-tax price of such insurance, it is 
not the only one. We identify two other factors that affect the after-tax cost of 
employer-provided  health insurance, and that consequently affect the relative 
price of this insurance vis-8-vis self insurance. First, because insurance firms 
include a load factor in their policy prices, the expected value of medical care 
outlays from $1 of  spending on medical insurance is less than the expected 
4. Several recent studies, notably Gruber and Krueger (1991) and Gruber (1994), support this 
assumption with respect to various types of employer mandates. 
5.  Woodbury and Hamermesh’s (1992) study of how the TRA86 affected the demand for fringe 
benefits vs. wage income at universities is a recent example in this tradition. Earlier studies that 
adopt similar approaches but sometimes omit either the state tax or payroll tax include Sloan and 
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value from $1 of out-of-pocket medical spending. The load factor, A,  reflects 
costs of  administering  an insurance plan, the profits of the insurer, and any 
other expenses incurred in minimizing the health risk of a given group to the 
insurer. This load factor affects the after-tax cost of employer-provided insur- 
ance relative to self-insurance of medical care costs. 
Second, contrary to the assumption of complete employer provision of insur- 
ance above, employees pay a substantial and rising fraction, currently about 15 
percent, of the premiums for employer-provided insurance. Blostin, Grant, and 
Wiatrowski (1992) report that in 1989, nearly half of the employees who re- 
ceived employer-provided health care benefits contributed to the cost of indi- 
vidual coverage, while for two-thirds of these workers, contributions were re- 
quired for family coverage. Approximately three-quarters of these employee 
premiums are paid after tax, and paying them is a requirement of taking advan- 
tage of the favorable tax treatment of employer-provided insurance.6 Employ- 
ees who must make after-tax contributions to their employer-provided insur- 
ance receive  favorable  tax  treatment  on a  smaller fraction  of  their  health 
insurance than those employees whose insurance is fully provided by the em- 
ployer. Recognizing employee contributions to the cost of employer-provided 
insurance therefore raises the after-tax price of this insurance. In defining the 
after-tax  price  of  insurance,  we use  G  to  denote  employee  payments  for 
employer-provided group insurance and E to denote employer payments. We 
assume that a fraction 6 of  employee premiums can be paid for on a pretax 
basis through cafeteria plans and other tax-favored arrangements. 
One question that arises in considering employee payments for health insur- 
ance is why employers structure health plans with such payments, despite their 
tax inefficiency. There are at least two possible reasons. First, within any work- 
place, different workers will place different values on the benefit of  health 
insurance coverage. Unless employers can selectively lower the wages of only 
those employees who value insurance coverage, employers who pay  the full 
cost of insurance will disproportionately attract workers with a high value of 
insurance. Employers may view this outcome as unattractive, for example be- 
cause the workers who value insurance the most may be less healthy and there- 
fore less productive workers. Cost sharing can be an effective mechanism for 
reducing the selection effects associated with health insurance provision. 
A second reason for employers to require some employee contributions re- 
lates to employee choice of health care plan. Many employers offer a choice 
across plans of  differing generosity and cost. Employers may not be able to 
6.  The US.  Bureau of Labor Statistics (1993, 1994) reports that approximately 33 percent of 
employees of firms with more than  100 employees, and 20 percent of employees of firms with 
fewer than 100 employees, can deduct their own premium payments from taxes. These are employ- 
ees who can pay their premiums through cafeteria plans provided by their employers. We  are not 
able to identify which employees can make pretax premium payments in the data below, so we 
randomly assign individuals to the pretax employee premium group with a probability of .25. This 
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pay lower wages to employees who choose higher cost plans, and cost sharing 
can be used to induce choice of cost-effective insurance. 
Recognizing both the load factor on employer-provided  insurance and the 
existence of employee contributions to such insurance yields the following ex- 
pression for the after-tax price of employer-provided insurance: 
We define the tax subsidy to employer-provided  insurance by comparing this 
after-tax price with the after-tax cost of self-insurance. 
5.1.2  After-Tax Cost of Out-of-Pocket Medical Spending 
It is widely recognized that the income tax code provides a form of insur- 
ance against large medical costs by permitting a deduction against taxable in- 
come for medical expenditures above a certain share of AGI. This provision of 
the tax code discourages insurance purchase since it lowers the after-tax cost 
of paying  high medical  expenses  out of pocket.  Bradford (1984) and more 
recently Kaplow (1991, 1992) discuss the implicit insurance in the tax system, 
but none of the previous studies of the tax subsidy to employer-provided insur- 
ance have considered this aspect of the income tax code. 
The tax subsidy to out-of-pocket medical expenses depends on whether a 
taxpayer itemizes. For a nonitemizer, the after-tax cost of such spending is $1. 
For itemizers,  however, the  after-tax  cost of  the marginal dollar  of  out-of- 
pocket medical spending is  1 -  OLT,  where T is the federal marginal tax rate 
and a = 1 if the marginal dollar of  spending exceeds the AGI floor and zero 
otherwise. We assume that medical expenses cannot be deducted in computing 
state taxable income. 
For an individual considering the purchase of insurance, a  is unknown. It is 
determined by the individual’s taxable income and realized need for medical 
services during a tax year. If F denotes the AGI threshold above which medical 
expenses are deductible and T the individual’s total medical spending, then the 
probability  that the last dollar of health expenditures will be tax deductible 
(a  = 1) equals the probability that T -  F >  0.’ This is the probability that the 
marginal dollar of health costs covered by employer-provided insurance would 
have been deductible if it had been incurred on own account. We have no direct 
information on how individuals form expectations of a in contemplating insur- 
ance purchases. We therefore assume rational expectations about actual spend- 
ing during the year, calculate actual values of ci  for all households in our data 
7. Total medical spending is E + G + 0, where E is the value of employer-provided insurance, 
G is personal spending on group insurance premiums, and 0 is individual out-of-pocket health 
care spending. We  assume that out-of-pocket spending for those with employer-provided insur- 
ance would not be affected by a shift to self-insurance. The tax-deductible share of  the nddirional 
medical spending that would result from reduced employer-provided insurance depends on the 
probability that E + G + 0 -  F > 0, rather than the probability that E + G -  F > 0. 141  Employer-Provided Health Insurance 
sample, and use these values in place of expected values in  calculating the 
after-tax price of insurance.* 
Individuals  with health  insurance  typically  face lower marginal  costs of 
health care services at the time of consumption than individuals without such 
insurance. This may affect their demand for medical services, and it suggests 
that total medical outlays, T above, may be a function of an individual’s insur- 
ance regime. We address this by computing a  under two different assumptions 
about the link between price at time of consumption and medical spending. 
We first assume that total medical spending is unaffected by the presence or 
absence of health insurance. Our second case assumes that the price elasticity 
of demand for medical care services is -0.33.9 Our findings are relatively in- 
sensitive to our assumption about the link between insurance status and T be- 
cause for most households a  is zero. 
The foregoing discussion focuses on the after-tax cost of a marginal dollar 
of  health care spending, which we label marginal a.  This should be distin- 
guished from the fraction of insured spending that would be tax deductible if 
the individual were not insured, (T -  F)/T, which we label average a. Both 
marginal and average a  range between zero and one. Marginal a  describes the 
after-tax  cost  of  the  medical  expenses  that  an  individual  would  incur  if 
employer-provided health insurance coverage were reduced by $1 and the re- 
sulting drop in insured medical care were replaced with out-of-pocket spend- 
ing. Marginal a  will only equal unity if  the insured individual  already has 
out-of-pocket spending in excess of the AGI floor. Relatively few insured indi- 
viduals are in this situation. Average a  corresponds to the after-tax cost of 
replacing all insured medical expenditures with out-of-pocket spending. Aver- 
age a  will be positive whenever total medical spending, including insurance, 
exceeds the AGI floor. When we tabulate the tax subsidy to employer provided 
insurance in tables 5.4 and 5.5 below, we use average a  in our expressions for 
the after-tax price. For analyzing the effect of tax caps on insurance spending, 
however, we use marginal a in our calculations since individuals are adjusting 
insurance purchases on the margin. Using marginal a  may cause us to overstate 
the subsidy to insurance and therefore the reduction in insurance that results 
from tax caps, if tax policy changes are not marginal. 
5.1.3  Relative After-Tax Price of Insurance 
We define the relative after-tax price of employer-provided insurance as the 
ratio of the after-tax price of this insurance to the after-tax cost of  out-of- 
pocket medical spending: 
8. Newhouse et al. (1989) report that  the  best predictor of current medical spending is past 
spending. 
9. We measure the marginal copayment rate for those with insurance as the ratio of their out- 
of-pocket medical spending to  total medical spending. This is likely to be closer to the average 
than to the marginal copayment rate, but we do not have any further information in  our data set to 
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If the tax code treated insurance premia and medical expenditures symmetri- 
cally-for  example, if neither were deductible from taxable income or if both 
could be excluded from federal and state taxable income and from the payroll 
tax  wage base-then  the cost of insurance relative to the direct outlays on 
medical care would be P,,  = 1 + A.  We therefore consider the tax-induced 
distortion in the relative price of insurance to be [PJ  1 + A) -  11, where P,, 
is given by equation (3). 
Our measures of the after-tax price of health insurance and the relative price 
of insurance suffer from at least four limitations. First, we fail to distinguish 
between marginal purchases of incremental employer-provided insurance and 
the discrete decision to purchase such insurance. The load factors on marginal 
insurance purchases may be lower than average loads if these loads in part 
reflect administrative costs that do not rise when a policy becomes more ex- 
tensive. 
Second, we assume that when expenditures on employer-provided insurance 
fall, employer (E)  and employee (G) spending decline in equal proportion. In 
fact, many employers contribute a flat amount to their group health insurance 
plans, and employees contribute the differential cost between the plan that they 
choose and the lowest cost option. In such cases, if  G is not tax deductible, 
then there is no tax subsidy to insurance on the margin. Thus, our results below 
will overstate the average tax subsidy to workplace insurance. 
Third, our formation ignores the possibility that individuals may be able to 
pay for their out-of-pocket medical costs with pretax dollars, as, for example, 
with medical spending accounts that are provided in some cafeteria plans. This 
will also lead us to overstate the tax subsidy to insurance by understating the 
tax benefit of self-insurance. Unfortunately, we have no data on the structure 
of employer contributions or the availability of such pretax out-of-pocket ar- 
rangements. 
Finally, we exclude any possible link between changes in the tax treatment 
of employer-provided insurance and the aggregate level of health care spend- 
ing. We emphasize the relative cost of employer-provided insurance versus out- 
of-pocket  spending, but  our estimates of  the  after-tax  price  of  employer- 
provided health insurance, P,,  in equation (2), could also be used to assess the 
effects of insurance tax treatment on the demand for medical care. 
5.2  Data Sources on Medical Care Spending and Tax Rates 
This section describes our methodology for estimating the various parame- 
ters, such as marginal tax rates, load factors, and probabilities  that medical 
expenditures are deductible from income taxes, that enter our expression for 143  Employer-Provided Health Insurance 
the relative price of employer-provided health insurance. Because our analysis 
requires detailed information on the pattern of health care expenditures as well 
as the tax circumstances of individuals and households, we use the U.S. Trea- 
sury Individual Tax  Model and the NBER TAXSIM program to impute tax 
rates to family units in the 1987 NMES. We then draw on the information on 
health insurance and health care spending in this database to analyze the effect 
of tax subsidies to employer-provided health insurance. 
5.2.1  NMES Sample 
We are not aware of any data set that includes detailed information on health 
insurance coverage, health care spending, and federal income tax status. The 
NMES is the best available household-level database on health care spending. 
This is a nationally  representative  household  survey that  followed roughly 
20,000 families during 1987. It gathered information on the demographic and 
economic characteristics of both family units and individual family members, 
including information on labor force attachment and income by source. It also 
collected detailed data on insurance plans, and these data were cross-checked 
against information collected from insurance sources such as employers or in- 
surance companies. The NMES includes information on expenditures on a va- 
riety of types of medical care. Most of this information was also cross-checked 
by interviews with medical providers. 
To impute tax information such as marginal tax rates and itemization status 
to survey respondents in the NMES, we aggregate individual NMES respon- 
dents  into “health insurance units”  (HIUs). These units include  the family 
head, his or her spouse, any children under age 19, and full-time students until 
they reach age 23. There may be multiple family heads within a household, for 
example, when elderly parents live with a younger nuclear family. We limit our 
sample to employed individuals and exclude the self-employed, families with 
someone who is aged 65 or over and therefore eligible for Medicare, families 
with anyone who is eligible for Medicaid, and families with missing informa- 
tion on insurance status. 
Table 5.1 shows the quantitative importance of the various data restrictions 
that we have imposed in selecting our sample. The NMES universe contains 
20,028 HIUs who represent a total of 168.5 million family heads and spouses. 
Since family heads and spouses are the only relevant decision makers for insur- 
ance purchases, we use only their sample weights in making our calculations. 
We define families as employed if either the head or spouse is employed and 
as self-employed if both the family head and spouse are self-employed. 
We  define families as insured if  both  the family  head  and  that person’s 
spouse report that they are insured in the fourth wave of the survey and if they 
report some spending, either by their employer or by themselves, on employer- 
provided group health insurance. Our analysis excludes some employed fami- 
lies who purchase individual insurance only since we are focusing on the tax 
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Table 5.1  Sample Size and Sample Limitations from the 1987 NMES 
Restriction 
Weighted to Represent 
US. Population” 
Families in NMES Sample  (millions) 
Total NMES sample 
-  Households with anyone over age 64 
Subtotal 
-  Medicaid households 
Subtotal 
-  Nonrespondents to insurance status 
Subtotal 
-  Families that are neither “insured’ nor 
Subtotal 
-  Self-employed families 
Subtotal 
-  Unemployed families 
Subtotal 
-  Families with zero weight 
or oldest member under age 18 
questions on NMES Wave IV 



















Source: Authors’ tabulations using 1987 NMES. 
”Weighted  totals are weighted by sum of head and spouse weights. 
if  they report both the family head and spouse to be uninsured and have no 
employer-provided insurance. Since the NMES does not report insurance plan 
information for all persons, our definition excludes relatively more insured per- 
sons from the sample than uninsured persons.’O Our final sample has 5,961 
HIUs, representing a total of 7 1.1 million household heads and spouses. 
Table 5.2 presents information on the insurance status of the individuals in 
the employed family units in our NMES sample. Just over 82 percent of our 
population-weighted sample, or 58.4 million household heads or their spouses, 
are part of an employed household and have employer-provided insurance. Our 
analysis suggests that  12.7 million employed individuals are uninsured. This 
translates into a higher fraction of employed individuals classified as uninsured 
than some other sources, but the disparity is explained by our stringent criteria 
for defining a household as insured.” Within the subsample that reports some 
employer-provided insurance, 42 percent have employer contributions only for 
insurance, and 52 percent have both employer and own contributions. Only 5 
10. We also exclude NMES families with sample weights of zero. These are families that were 
added to the NMES during the survey year, for example, because they moved into an existing 
NMES household as a subfamily. 
11. Our  analysis yields estimates of  the number of  uninsured employed individuals that are 
similar to those in other studies. 145  Employer-Provided Health Insurance 




Only employer premiums 
(E>O, Z+G=O) 
Only individual premiums 
(E=O, G>O) 
Employer and individual premiums 
(E>O, G>O) 
Uninsured (E=G=O) and self-reported 
uninsured 
Total 
Source: Estimates based on authors’ tabulations from the 1987 NMES. HIUs, weighted to reflect 
the sampling probabilities of family heads and spouses, are the basis for tabulations. Calculations 
exclude individuals in households with anyone over age 65. Values in parentheses are number of 
NMES households in each group. 
percent  of  the  households  in  our  sample  report  paying  the  full  cost  of 
employer-provided insurance themselves. 
Table 5.3 reports the distribution of spending on tax-subsidized employer- 
provided insurance in our NMES sample. The subsample used to construct this 
table is the set of all individuals who are employed and who we classify as 
covered by employer-provided insurance. Column (1) shows the value of em- 
ployer contributions for insurance (E),  and column (2) shows the value of both 
employer contributions and  pretax  contributions by  employees  (E + 6G). 
While the NMES figures are measured in 1987 dollars, all results in this paper 
have been inflated to 1994 dollars using the growth in personal health spending 
over the 1987-94  period.12 
Table 5.3 shows that the mean value of employer-provided health insurance 
is $4,249. The mean value of employer and pretax employee spending is ap- 
proximately 5 percent higher ($4,483). The distribution of this tax-subsidized 
spending is somewhat skewed, as is revealed by the lower median  values. 
Nearly  10 percent of  the sample reports employer contributions worth more 
than $8,000 per year, and more than one-quarter report values of  less than 
$2,000. 
5.2.2  Tax Rate Estimation 
To estimate the marginal federal tax rate facing each NMES household, we 
must estimate each household’s federal taxable income. The NMES reports 
12. The CBO (1993) presents data on private health insurance expenditures in 1987 ($155 bil- 
lion), along with forecasts for 1993 ($289 billion) and 1995 ($343 billion). We  estimate  1994 
expenditures by  interpolating between the 1993 and 1995 forecasts; this yields $316 billion. We 
then use the ratio of  1994 to 1987 spending, $316/$155, or 2.039, to impute the distribution of 
1987 spending to 1994. The estimates in table 5.3 may overstate actual employer contributions for 
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Table 5.3  Distribution of Expenditures on Employer-Provided Health 
Insurance in the 1987 NMES (converted to 1994 dollars) 
Employer Spending  Employer Plus Pretax Employee Spending 


























Source: Authors’ tabulations using 1987 NMES data. Estimates for 1994 are based on the ratio of 
total private health insurance spending in 1994 to that in 1987, as projected in CBO (1993). 
information on a variety of family income flows, such as wage income, divi- 
dend income, and interest income, although it does not contain nearly as much 
detail on income sources as a tax return. In particular, it does not report capital 
gains income, which we set equal to zero.I3 
The NMES also asked respondents whether they itemized deductions for 
income tax purposes. This is a critical input to our calculation of both tax rates 
and  the  probability  of  deducting out-of-pocket  medical  expenditures.  The 
NMES figures for itemization differ from those in the Treasury tax model, 
although we did not find any systematic pattern in the differences. In  1987, 
58.1 percent of the joint filers in the Treasury tax model database, excluding 
those who claimed any household members aged 65 or over, itemized deduc- 
tions; the figure is 48.5 percent in the NMES. This pattern is reversed for non- 
joint filers, with the NMES itemizing share 18.3 percent and the Treasury tax 
model  share  16.9 percent,  again  excluding those  aged  65 and over. If  the 
NMES understates the incidence of itemization, our results will tend to over- 
state the tax subsidy to employer-provided insurance. 
We conduct our analysis using the reported  1987 data on medical care and 
insurance spending (inflated to 1994 levels, as described above), but we con- 
sider the tax subsidy to health insurance under  several different income tax 
regimes. We ask what the tax subsidy to the level of health insurance purchased 
in 1987 would have been if households faced the tax rates that they faced in 
1986, 1989, and 1994. To do this we “age” taxable income in the NMES data- 
base to 1986, to analyze the tax code in effect before TRA86, to 1989, when 
13. Imputing capital gains income to individuals by  income category made little difference to 
the estimates of  after-tax insurance prices in Gmber and Poterba (1994). Besides capital gains, 
TAXSIM  uses a number of other income items reported on a tax return, such as contributions to 
IRAs and Keogh accounts and self-employed business deductions, to compute taxable income and 
marginal tax rates. We set any tax return item for which we do not have information in the NMES 
equal to zero in estimating taxable income. 147  Employer-Provided Health Insurance 
TRA86 was fully effective, and to 1994, the most recent tax year. Our aging 
procedure is a simplified version of  that developed by  Lindsey (1987). We 
assume that each family’s AGI changes from year to year in the same way that 
average per capita AGI changes between years. 
Our estimate of  the marginal state tax rate facing each household is less 
precise than our estimate of  the federal tax rate. The NMES does not report 
the respondent’s state of residence, but rather reports four census regions. We 
therefore create 12 “stylized families,” 6 joint filers and 6 single filers, at differ- 
ent income levels. We  use TAXSIM to estimate state-specific marginal tax 
rates for each of these stylized families, and we then compute state-population- 
weighted averages within each census region for each of  these family types. 
We  then assign one of these averages to each NMES household by identifying 
them as similar to one of the stylized households. 
Our calculation of each individual’s marginal social security tax rate follows 
Feldstein and Samwick (1992a). They note that the statutory social security 
tax rate is not the true marginal rate since prospective benefits are linked to 
taxes paid. This linkage varies according to income and gender since the bene- 
fit formula is redistributive and since on average women live longer and there- 
fore receive a higher present discounted value of benefits than men. The social 
security system also redistributes across households with different configura- 
tions of  primary and secondary earners since secondary earners receive the 
higher of  their benefits and  one-half of  the benefits of  the primary earner. 
Feldstein and Samwick find that effective marginal tax rates vary from nega- 
tive values (subsidies to labor supply) for some households to the statutory 
marginal tax rate for other households. As a result, our tax prices would be 
misspecified if we used the statutory social security tax rate.I4  We estimate the 
effective marginal social security tax rate facing each NMES respondent using 
data that Feldstein and Samwick (1992b) present on tax rates by age, sex, and 
family labor supply.  l5 
Individuals also pay payroll taxes for disability insurance and for Medicare 
hospital insurance. We  accounted for the former by grossing up the Feldstein- 
Samwick net tax rates by the ratio of the statutory tax rate for both OASI and 
disability insurance to the statutory OASI tax rate, under the assumption that 
disability insurance tax-benefit linkages follow the same pattern as those for 
OASI.I6  For individuals with labor income in excess of the taxable social secu- 
14. Using statutory tax rate without adjustment ignores the fact that higher social security tax 
collections today will be offset by higher social security benefit payouts in the future. 
15. We assign the Feldstein-Samwick (1992b) effective tax rate for single men to single men or 
to families where the wife earns more than one-half of the husband’s earnings. We assign their rate 
for women to single women, and their rate for men with dependent spouses to those families where 
the wife’s earnings are less than one-half the husband’s earnings. One limitation of this approach 
is that we are using point-in-time labor supply to proxy for the relative earnings of husbands and 
wives over their lives, but that is all that is available in the NMES. 
16. This is a crude assumption since disability insurance benefits accrue to a different popula- 
tion, with many more young men, than OASI benefits. In addition, there are other limitations to 148  Jonathan Gruber and James M. Poterba 
rity maximum, we set T,, equal to zero. In the latter case, there is no tax-benefit 
linkage since all citizens receive Medicare at age 65 regardless of their work 
history. We therefore use the statutory Medicare tax rate in our calculation. 
5.2.3  Comparison with Earlier Studies 
Our methodology differs from that in the CBO’s (1994b) study of tax subsid- 
ies to health insurance, the most prominent recent study of related issues, in 
using the NMES as the central database for analysis. The CBO study imputed 
information from both the NMES and individual tax records to a third data set, 
the Current Population  Survey (CPS). This has the advantage of  providing 
more detailed income information than the NMES, as well as a larger sample 
of respondents and the associated opportunity for more precise within-group 
analysis. But it has the disadvantage of compressing the substantial heteroge- 
neity across individuals in their health care spending, and the correlation of 
that spending with health insurance circumstances, in the process of  imputa- 
tion. In addition, the CPS does not report itemization status, while the NMES 
does.  Given our  limited  objective  in  analyzing  tax  subsidies  to  employer- 
provided health insurance, and our focus on national aggregates, we would not 
gain substantially from access to the additional information that is potentially 
available in the CPS. 
Our analysis is closer in spirit to Taylor and Wilensky’s (1983) study of tax 
incentives and employer-provided health  insurance  than to the recent  CBO 
(1994b) study.  Although Taylor and Wilensky (1983) did not consider a number 
of the factors we described above, such as the role of  insurance loads, state 
taxes, and the share of  employee-paid health insurance premiums,  they did 
use an earlier data set similar to the NMES, the 1977 National Medical Care 
Expenditure Survey (NMCES), as the basis for their study. They imputed infor- 
mation on tax status to households in the NMCES and computed a variety of 
summary statistics on tax subsidies to health insurance. 
5.3  New Estimates of the Tax Subsidy to Employer-Provided 
Health Insurance 
We summarize our analysis of the tax subsidy to employer-provided insur- 
ance by reporting average values of the after-tax relative price of  employer- 
provided insurance and out-of-pocket medical spending, P,,, under two differ- 
ent assumptions about the effect of insurance status on total medical spending. 
Recall from the discussion above that these summary statistics use information 
the Feldstein-Samwick net tax rate calculation, such as the fact that some social security benefits 
accrue to dependents of contributors, and the fact that social security may substitute for an imper- 
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on average, rather than marginal, a.  To permit comparison with earlier studies, 
we also report the sample average of the change in after-tax employee wage 
income for each dollar of employer-provided health insurance (dw,/dE). 
Table 5.4 presents these summary statistics when each of the NMES families 
is assigned its federal marginal tax rate for 1986, 1989, and 1994. We report 
both the average value of the relative after-tax price of insurance and out-of- 
pocket care, as well as the cross-sectional standard deviation of this price. We 
distinguish two subgroups of the employed population, those with and without 
insurance, and tabulate results separately for each. 
The results for insured employed families, using the 1994 federal tax code, 
illustrate our general findings. The average value of the reduction in after-tax 
wage income per dollar of  employer spending on health insurance is 0.682. 
This implies that federal income and payroll taxes, and state income taxes, 
place a 31.8 percent tax wedge between the after-tax cost of  all other goods 
($1)  and the after-tax cost of  employer-provided health  insurance. There is 
substantial disparity across households in the magnitude of  this subsidy: the 
standard deviation of dw,/dE  is .117. Comparing the results for 1986 with 
those  for either  1989 or  1994 demonstrates that  the tax rate reductions in 
TRA86 raised the after-tax wage cost of employer-provided benefits by an av- 
erage of about four cents per dollar.” The changes in the structure of tax rates 
between  1989 and  1994, because they were concentrated  on a small group 
of  high-income households, did not substantially affect the average after-tax 
wage cost. 
The two lower rows of table 5.4 present our estimates of P,,  from equation 
(3).  This ratio is substantially higher than the after-tax wage cost of employer- 
provided health insurance benefits because it multiplies the after-tax wage cost 
by  1 + A to reflect the insurance load factor, because it includes less favorably 
taxed employee contributions for health insurance in the numerator, and be- 
cause the denominator (1 -  a~)  is less than 1. 
The average value of P,,  for the 1994 tax code is 0.837 if we assume that 
medical spending is unaffected by whether or not an individual is insured; it 
falls to 0.8 11 if we assume that spending would be reduced, since the tax sub- 
sidy to self-insurance is then less valuable. There is somewhat more heteroge- 
neity in these measures than in the simple after-tax wage cost measures in the 
first row; the standard deviation of Prel  is .15 1 when insurance status does not 
affect medical care needs and .147 when we allow this type of feedback. More- 
over, the average value of P,,  rises less between 1986 and 1989 than the after- 
tax wage cost of  health insurance. This is because TRA86 reduced marginal 
tax rates for some households but also raised the AGI threshold for deducting 
medical expenses from 5 to 7.5 percent. This reduced a,  thereby raising the 
17. This is consistent with Hausman and Poterba’s (1987) finding that TRA86 actually raised 
marginal tax rates for more than one-third of taxpayers. For most of those who received rate reduc- 
tions, these reductions were relatively small. Table 5.4  Tax Subsidies to Employer-Provided  Health Insurance 
Insured Employed  Uninsured Employed 
1986  1989  1994  1986  1989  1994 
~~ 
dw,ldE  0.643  0.683  0.682  0.804  0.827  0.828 
(.123)  (.111)  (.117)  (.143)  (.157)  (.194) 
PA 
q=O to impute health spending if uninsured  0.814  0.839  0.837  0.926  0.945  0.945 
(.170)  (.149)  (.151)  (.136)  (.144)  (.173) 
q=  -0.33  to impute health spending if uninsured  0.779  0.813  0.811  0.932  0.949  0.950 
(.165)  (.145)  (.147)  (.137)  (.143)  (.171) 
Source: Authors’ tabulations based on  imputation of  tax rates to households in  1987 NMES. Each entry reports the average price weighted by  family insurance 
spending. Column headings indicate which year’s federal income tax and payroll tax schedule was used in constructing marginal tax rates. 
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after-tax cost of out-of-pocket medical care and partly offsetting the change in 
marginal rates. 
We have also assessed the sensitivity of these results to variation in other tax 
parameters. We analyzed the effect of changing the AGI threshold for medical 
expenses, assuming 1994 tax rates, to illustrate how this aspect of the tax code 
affects incentives for insurance purchase. Lowering the AGI threshold from 
7.5 to 2 percent, the pre-1983 level, raises the average value of  P,,  for the 
insured employed from 0.837 to 0.902 when we assume a zero price elasticity 
of medical care demand, and from 0.81  1 to 0.868 when we assume an elasticity 
of  -0.33.  This policy  change therefore has a much larger effect than  the 
change in marginal tax rates under TRA86. It suggests that our recognition of 
the role of tax subsidies to out-of-pocket spending can be an important deter- 
minant of  the after-tax price of  insurance, even though at the current level of 
the medical expense deduction threshold, this effect is relatively small. 
We  also tried replacing the Feldstein-Samwick social security tax rate with 
the statutory tax rate. This induced a fine percentage point decline in the rela- 
tive insurance price, highlighting the importance of accounting for tax-benefit 
linkages in the analysis of social security. 
Table 5.4 makes it possible to compare the average relative prices for the 
insured and uninsured employed groups. The uninsured employed face higher 
average prices for employer-provided insurance than do their insured counter- 
parts. This is because they are on average in lower income groups, and there- 
fore face lower marginal tax rates, than the insured employed. Some of  the 
observed relationship, of course, could reflect a demand curve for health insur- 
ance: those who face higher prices are less likely to buy insurance. Without 
more detailed analysis, however, it is impossible to disentangle the heterogene- 
ity and demand curve effects. 
For the uninsured employed, using statutory social security tax rates in place 
of  the Feldstein-Samwick adjusted rates also causes a substantial increase in 
the measured tax subsidy to insurance. This is because a substantial fraction 
of the uninsured employed have earnings in the range over which the present 
discounted value of  the social security benefit increment associated with an 
additional dollar of  earnings offsets a substantial fraction of  social security 
tax payments. 
One reason for measuring the tax subsidy to employer-provided insurance 
is to estimate the efficiency cost associated with this tax expenditure. Table 5.5 
presents the first step in any such calculation, our estimate of the price distor- 
tion induced by  the tax system. Recall that if  there were no tax distortions, 
P,,  = 1 + A.  We therefore use our estimate of P,,  with the actual tax system 
to compute PJ(  1 + A) -  1. The average value of this distortion declined from 
approximately 0.29 in  1986 to 0.26 by  1989; it has changed relatively little 
since then. It is notable that this estimate of the tax distortion is smaller than 
1 -  dw,/dE,  the distortion that is associated with the standard analysis of the 
tax incentive for fringe benefit provision (first row). In  1994, for example, the 152  Jonathan Gruber and James M. Poterba 
Table 5.5  Tax Distortions in the Relative After-Tax Price of Employer-Provided 
Health Insurance 
1986  1989  1994 
dw,ldE  0.357  0.317  0.318 
r(=O  to impute health spending if uninsured  0.286  0.261  0.263 
y=  -0.33  to impute health spending if uninsured  0.321  0.287  0.289 
Source: Authors’ tabulations based on imputation of tax rates from various years to households in 
1987 NMES. Each entry reports the difference between the price of insurance with no tax subsidy 
(1 for the first row and 1.101 for the second two rows) and the price with the tax subsidy. Sample 
is employer-insured individuals. 
p,,, 
estimated tax  subsidy is 20 percent  smaller than the  traditional  measure of 
the tax price. Since the deadweight loss from this subsidy rises with the square 
of the size of the subsidy, our calculations imply that the deadweight loss from 
tax subsidization is roughly 40 percent less than would be implied using the 
change in after-tax wages. 
Our estimate of the distortion based on P,,  changes less between 1986 and 
1989 than the average value of dw,ldE  because we recognize the role of em- 
ployee contributions to employer-provided health insurance, which dampen the 
tax subsidy, and because we include the 1986 increase in the AGI threshold for 
deducting out-of-pocket medical expenses in our analysis of the relative price 
of insurance. Our estimates therefore imply that the reduction in deadweight 
loss from the package of tax changes under TRA86 is much smaller than might 
be supposed based only on a comparison of dw,ldE  at different points in time. 
5.4  Capping the Amount of Tax-Exempt Employer-Provided 
Health Insurance 
The revenue loss associated with the tax expenditure for employer-provided 
health insurance, and a perception that overinsurance has contributed to the 
rise in U.S.  health care costs during the last two decades, has led to numerous 
proposals to alter the current tax treatment of employer-provided health insur- 
ance. One of the most common reform proposals, and one discussed at length 
in  CBO (1994b), is capping the value of  employer-provided insurance that 
could be excluded from taxable income. One special case of such caps would 
be  complete  inclusion of  the  value  of employer-provided insurance  in  em- 
ployee taxable income. In this section, we use our augmented NMES database 
to explore how various tax caps would affect the after-tax price of employer- 
provided health insurance, the demand for such insurance, and tax revenues. 
There are many ways to tax employer-provided  health  insurance. Burman 
and Williams (1994) provide a detailed discussion of several options, including 
changes in the corporate tax deductibility of such insurance payments, as well 
as including some or all of the value of these benefits in the personal income 
tax base. Our analysis focuses on the case in which employers report the value 153  Employer-Provided Health Insurance 
of  employer-provided insurance benefits along with an employee’s wage in- 
come and these benefits are then incorporated in the federal and state income 
tax base and the federal payroll tax base. In principle, there is no reason that 
employer-provided insurance needs to be taxed in all three forms,  and one 
could disentangle the revenue effects associated with different types of incre- 
mental tax changes. We discuss the importance of the relative sources of reve- 
nue below. 
By considering the case in which tax caps are implemented through the per- 
sonal income tax, our analysis applies to tax caps that are specified for tax- 
filing units rather than individuals. Such family-level caps would be very diffi- 
cult to implement through any system that relied on changes in the corporate 
rather than personal income tax. If caps were applied to individuals rather than 
families, two-earner couples in which both earners had an opportunity to re- 
ceive employer-provided insurance could reduce the impact of the caps by 
choosing two individual policies rather than a single family policy. Caps on 
tax-unit health insurance benefits such as those we consider provide a strong 
incentive for households with two earners to eliminate duplicative insurance 
coverage since such insurance is likely to provide relatively little health benefit 
but could lead to a substantial increase in taxable income. 
5.4.1  Analyzing Tax Caps 
At the outset, we should recognize several basic points about tax caps. First, 
the  cap  should not  affect the behavior  of  anyone who receives  employer- 
provided health insurance benefits worth less than the cap.I8 Second, absent 
income effects, no one whose employer-provided health insurance exceeds the 
cap value prior to imposition of the cap should reduce his insurance outlays to 
less than the capped level. A system of tax caps would provide strong incen- 
tives for employers and employees to restructure benefits packages to reduce 
the fraction of health insurance value that exceeds the cap and to maximize the 
chance that the cost of coverage above this cap is paid by the employee, who 
may have an opportunity to deduct some insurance costs as itemized medical 
 deduction^.'^ One example of such a reaction would be scaling back the set of 
services covered by the employer-provided insurance plan, while introducing 
a cafeteria plan to allow workers to pay some of these costs with pretax dollars. 
We ignore any such responses to tax caps in computing the revenue and behav- 
ioral effects below, but they could be important in practice. 
We estimate how tax caps of various dollar amounts would affect the aver- 
age after-tax relative price of health insurance and out-of-pocket spending by 
18. It is possible that caps on the excludable amount of employer-provided  health insurance may 
reduce the demand for generous coverage from some employees who previously received benefits 
worth more than the cap and that this will work through the negotiation process that  results in a 
benefits and wage package to reduce the level of health benefits. 
19. We consider a tax cap that applies to federal and state income taxes, as well as payroll taxes. 
If the cap were only applied to federal income taxes, the incentive to reduce health insurance value 
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setting the relative tax price for any NMES family with  employer-provided 
insurance above the cap to (1 + A)/(  1 -  OLT).  This is just the expression for the 
after-tax cost of  health insurance in equation (3), with T = 7,  = T,, = 0 in the 
numerator. Since the families who are most likely to be affected by any cap 
are those with high incomes, high marginal tax rates, and therefore high values 
of the tax subsidy before the cap, the change in the average after-tax relative 
price of insurance can be substantial even if the number of households affected 
by  the cap is small. Throughout  our tax cap analysis we use marginal a  in 
evaluating equation (3) since this is the appropriate parameter for evaluating a 
marginal reduction in spending on employer-provided  insurance as would be 
associated with a tax cap. 
After  describing  the  change in  the  after-tax  relative  price  of  employer- 
provided health insurance associated with the tax caps, we present illustrative 
calculations of how these caps would affect the demand for employer-provided 
insurance. We assume that caps would apply to all employer-provided  insur- 
ance that was subsidized before the cap was enacted, regardless of whether this 
insurance was paid for by employers or employees making pretax  contribu- 
tions.20 
For each NMES family, we compute the marginal after-tax relative price of 
employer-provided  insurance under the status quo (P,,,,,)  and under the  as- 
sumption that employer-provided  insurance above the cap is included in tax- 
able income (Pre,,,).  If these two prices are identical, we assume that the indi- 
vidual would not change his demand for employer-provided insurance (  Eo).  If 
the two prices are different, however, we estimate the individual’s demand for 
health insurance at the new price as 
(4) 
where C denotes the level of the cap. The parameter q is the uncompensated 
price elasticity of demand for health insurance. We do not consider any income 
effects on the demand for insurance that might be associated with the introduc- 
tion of tax caps. If  El is greater than C,  then we take El as the new level of 
employer-provided  insurance. If E, is less than C,  however, we assume that 
El = C and that the individual will locate at the kink point on the budget set. 
To find the aggregate change in the demand for employer-provided insurance 
as a result of a cap on the value of excludable benefits, we compute the sample- 
weighted sum of the changes in El across all NMES households. 
Our calculations make the strong assumption that each household affected 
by the tax cap can adjust the quantity of  employer-provided  health insurance 
that it receives in response to this tax policy change. This assumption is unreal- 
istic since most workplaces offer only a few discrete choices with respect to 
health insurance coverage. Moreover, since individual employees cannot deter- 
20. Excluding pretax employee contributions from the tax cap would result in a simple tax 
avoidance strategy. Firms would reduce their employer-provided health insurance but permit em- 
ployees to purchase equivalent insurance on a pretax basis. This would circumvent the tax caps. 155  Employer-Provided Health Insurance 
mine what benefits package their employer will offer, changes in the tax cir- 
cumstances of an individual worker may not be reflected in a differential level 
of employer-provided insurance. Recognizing the important heterogeneity in 
tax preferences and insurance demand within workplaces, and incorporating 
this into the analysis, is therefore an important direction for future work. 
A critical parameter in our calculation is -q,  the price elasticity of demand 
for health insurance. There are relatively few estimates of this parameter, and 
available estimates differ substantially (see Gruber and Poterba [1994] for a 
detailed review). There are also many different margins along which employ- 
ers might alter their health insurance offerings, and it is not clear that elasticit- 
ies of demand would be the same on all margins. For example, employers could 
reduce the value of  insurance coverage provided to their workers by limiting 
the set of  services covered, by raising copayment rates or deductibles, or by 
requiring a higher employee contribution for a given insurance policy. Previous 
studies, and our analysis below, treat adjustments on all of these margins as 
equivalent. 
Previous cross-sectional studies of the price elasticity of demand for health 
insurance can be grouped into three types.21  The first set of  studies compare 
the quantity of  health insurance demanded by  high- and low-income house- 
holds that face different marginal tax rates; these studies have produced a wide 
range of  elasticity estimates.22  The second set of  studies consider evidence 
from  hypothetical offers  of  supplemental insurance to  participants in  the 
RAND Health Insurance Experiment, reported in Marquis and Phelps (1987). 
This randomized experiment assigned individuals to plans with different co- 
payment rates, with an out-of-pocket maximum of up to $1,000. At the end of 
the experiment, individuals were presented with hypothetical offers for supple- 
mental insurance to lower their out-of-pocket exposure; the price of these of- 
fers varied across participants. The resulting elasticity of demand for the quan- 
tity of supplemental insurance was -0.6. 
The third source of information on the price elasticity of demand is evidence 
from the take-up of price subsidies that were offered to small firms under ex- 
perimental pilot projects. Thorpe et al. (1992) found an elasticity of demand 
of insurance coverage of  between -0.07  and -0.33  for these firms. Gruber 
and Poterba (1994) suggested a price elasticity of demand for insurance cover- 
age of -  1  .O  or greater in absolute value for self-employed individuals, focus- 
ing on tax changes to identify shifts in the after-tax price of insurance for this 
group. In light of this variation, we set q = -0.5  in our baseline case, and we 
also report analyses using values of -  1  .O and -0.2. 
The final aspect of the tax caps that we consider is their effect on total reve- 
21. There are also a number of  time-series studies, such as Turner (1987). 
22. Examples of  other studies that estimate the price elasticity of demand include nylor and 
Wilensky (1983), who report an elasticity of  -0.2;  Woodbury (1983). who reports -1.7  to -3.5; 
Holmer (1984), who reports -0.16;  Sloan and Adamache (1986), who report -0.6;  and Woodbury 
and Hamermesh (1992). who report -2  to -3. 156  Jonathan Gruber and James M. Poterba 
nue collections. We combine FICA, federal income tax, and state income tax 
revenue in our tabulations. Tax caps affect tax revenues in two ways. First, they 
collect taxes directly on employer-provided health insurance benefits that are 
valued at more than the tax cap. In addition, however, if some employees de- 
cide to reduce their demand for employer-provided health insurance as a result 
of  the tax cap and its associated increase in the marginal cost of insurance, 
then their taxable wages will rise as their employer-provided health insurance 
benefits decline. We assume that any reduction in employer-provided insurance 
will be reflected dollar for dollar in pretax wage payments to workers. 
The relative importance of the taxes collected on insurance benefits worth 
more than the cap and on increased taxable wages depends on the price elastic- 
ity of demand for health insurance. The total revenue collected as a result of 
the tax cap is independent of this elasticity, however, and just depends on the 
total value of employer-provided health benefits above the tax cap in the precap 
setting, that is, on the sum of E,, -  C across households. 
Finally, one important caveat to the results below is that we are using the 
total insurance expenditures of the HIU to identify the effect of tax caps. For 
some of  the HIUs  in our sample, insurance  expenditures reflect employer- 
provided insurance coverage to both spouses. A cap that was imposed on each 
spouse separately would therefore have smaller effects than those estimated 
For our base case described below, only  16 percent of HIUs (21.5 
percent  of couples) have multiple  insurance policies. Among those couples 
who face binding  tax caps, however, 32 percent have more than one policy 
(this is 24 percent of our total sample). This calculation overstates the effect 
of dual policies since, in some families with dual coverage, both spouses may 
have policies that exceed the cap. The problem of dual policies therefore does 
not appear to be an important limitation in applying the calculations reported 
below. 
5.4.2  Results on Tax Caps 
Table 5.6 presents our basic findings on tax caps for the case with a price 
elasticity of demand for health insurance equal to -0.5.  We consider four tax 
caps, all denominated in 1994  Our base case, shown in column (2), 
follows the caps suggested by CBO (1994a): $4,000 per year for joint filers, 
$1,600 per year for single filers, and $3,400 per year for heads of household. 
We then show the effects of (a) doubling these caps (col. [  11). (b) halving these 
23. If the cap were imposed on insurance spending by tax-filing unit, as it would be if it were 
implemented through the individual income tax system, then the cap would apply to total family 
insurance spending. This would create a strong incentive for families to drop duplicative insurance 
policies and might lead to a larger response in the quantity of  insurance demanded as a result of 
the tax cap. 
24. By inflating 1987 expenditures in the NMES by the deflator for personal health care spend- 
ing, we effectively index the tax caps to the medical cost deflator. If tax caps were indexed to the 
consumer price index rather than an index of medical care costs, the caps would become more 
stringent over time if health care inflation continues to outpace overall inflation. 157  Employer-Provided Health Insurance 
Table 5.6  Effect of Capping Employer-Provided Health Insurance Deduction 
Assumptions: 1994 Tax Code, q=-0.5 
Level of Tax Caps (1994 $): Joint FiledSingle FilerkIousehold Head 
8000/3200/6800  4000/1600/3400  2000/800/1700  O/O/O 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1  ' p,,  0.870  0.954  1.044  1.111 
(.155)  (.146)  (.120)  (.060) 
2.  Employed workers 
3.  Employed insured 
Changes in insurance 
affected (%)  0.119  0.509  0.704  0.821 
affected (%)  0.144  0.619  0.857  1  .OOo 
demand a 
4. Average change in E  -306  -985  -  1,267  -  1,308 
5.  Average change in E 
if a change  -2,123  -  1,590  -  1,477  -1,361 
Tax increase per insured 
employee' 
6.  Tax on insurance 
benefits  30.0  190.5  532.2  1,067.0 
7. Tax on higher wages  119.2  374.1  479.9  495.2 
8. Total  148.2  564.6  1,012.1  1,562.2 
Aggregate Revenue 
Raisedb 
9.  Tax on insurance 
benefits  1,690  11,123  3 1,075  62,303 
10. Tax on higher wages  6,762  21,846  28,023  28,915 
11. Total  8,652  32,969  59,097  91,218 
Notes: Insurance  market  responses  assume  a  price  elasticity  of  demand  -0.5  for employer- 
provided insurance. The base case value for the relative after-tax price in the first row, for the case 
with unlimited tax exclusion, is 0.837 (.151) as shown in table 5.4. Revenue effects on wage taxes 
assume that wages rise by  the full amount of any reduction in employer-provided insurance. See 
text for further details. 
"In dollars 
million dollars. 
caps (col. [3]), and (c) setting the caps to zero, so that all employer-provided 
health insurance benefits are included in taxable income (col. [4]). 
The results show that even tax caps that affect relatively few households 
can have substantial effects on the average relative after-tax price of employer- 
provided health insurance. The 8000/3200/6800 cap, which would have been 
binding for 14.4 percent of employed insured workers in 1987, raises the aver- 
age value of P,,  from 0.837 under the status quo to 0.870. The cap analyzed 
by the CBO has an even larger effect, with P,, rising to 0.954.25  This cap would 
affect over one-half of insured employees. Introducing caps first increases the 
variance of  the relative after-tax price in the population, but as the share of 
25. The relative price of insurance can in principle be greater than  1 because of  the loading 
factor on insurance and the subsidization of  self-insurance. 158  Jonathan Gruber and James M. Poterba 
households  affected  by  the  cap rises  and  more  and  more  households  face 
(1 + X)/(l -  (YT) as their relative tax price, the variance declines. In column 
(4), which corresponds to eliminating the tax subsidy for employer-provided 
insurance, the variance of after-tax relative prices falls substantially. 
Table 5.6 next reports our estimates of the change in the level of employer- 
provided insurance associated with each set of tax caps (rows 4 and 5). For the 
base case, for example, we calculate that the average reduction in insurance 
spending will be $565 per insured employee, or $33 billion. Because tax caps 
affect only a fraction of those employees with employer-provided health insur- 
ance, the decline in insurance levels for those who are affected by the caps is 
substantially larger than the average decline for all employees. 
The entries in column (4) of rows 4 and 5 warrant particular note. Our esti- 
mates with a price elasticity of insurance demand of  -0.5  suggest that elimi- 
nating the tax exemption for employer-provided health insurance would reduce 
the aggregate value of this insurance by 30.8 percent. This corresponds to an 
average per capita reduction of $1,308.26 
Rows 6-8  present information on the revenue effects of  changing the tax 
treatment of employer-provided insurance. We present the total revenue col- 
lected per insured employee (row 8) as well as the decomposition of this reve- 
nue between the tax on insurance premia above the cap and the tax on higher 
wages that result from reductions in employer-provided insurance. Rows 9-1  1 
report the aggregate revenue consequences of each of these policies. We report 
the total increase in federal income tax and payroll tax revenue, as well as the 
small increase in state income tax revenue. 
The entry in row  11 of  column  (4) shows that we estimate that elimina- 
tion of the tax exemption for employer-provided insurance would have raised 
$91.2  billion  (1994 dollars). More than two-thirds of  this  revenue  is raised 
from  taxes  on  the  insurance  that  remains  in  force  after  the  tax  subsidy 
is  removed.  This  estimate  is  about  one-fifth  higher  than  the  estimate  pre- 
sented  in  CBO (1994b),  even  though  the  CBO includes  both  the  revenue 
collected  by  taxing employer-provided  insurance  and  the revenue collected 
from  higher  wage  taxes.  The  CBO  excludes  some  employer-provided 
insurance  which  may  not  be  employment-related  and  so  begins  with  a 
smaller  annual  flow  of  employer-provided  insurance  than  we  Our 
estimates  are quite  similar to the  Joint  Committee on Taxation’s  estimates 
26. Table 5.6 indicates that the average change in employer-provided insurance for those af- 
fected by the elimination of  the tax exclusion is larger than the average change for all employed 
insured. There are 256 NMES respondents who report that they are insured by  their employers 
and who have some out-of-pocket spending on insurance, but who report zero employer contribu- 
tions for their insurance. The three-quarters of this group for whom out-of-pocket insurance spend- 
ing is not tax preferred will be unaffected by the repeal of the tax exemption. 
27. Another potential difference between our estimates and  those of  the CBO relates to our 
estimate of the prereform distribution of insurance spending. We  use the actual reported distribu- 
tion of employer-provided insurance premiums in the NMES, while the CBO made adjustments 
that lowered the estimated expenditures for high-income (and high tax rate) families. We are grate- 
ful to Roberton Williams for suggestions with regard to these disparities. 159  Employer-Provided Health Insurance 
of  the  total  revenue  cost  of  the  tax  expenditure  for  employer-provided 
insurance.28 
The revenue estimates for various tax cap proposals provide an indication 
of how much revenue could be raised by each alternative. Our base case 4000/ 
1600/3400 cap raises roughly one-third as much revenue as the total elimina- 
tion of the tax exclusion for employer-provided insurance. A much higher tax 
cap of 8000/3200/6800 only raises $8.6 billion. 
It is also quite interesting to consider the implications of alternative plans 
for insurance expenditures and revenue raising. The base case plan, which af- 
fects only 62 percent of  insured workers, reduces insurance expenditures by 
75 percent as much as removing the tax exclusion altogether. This is because, 
due to the somewhat skewed distribution of insurance spending, the 38 percent 
of HIUs that are not affected by the cap do not spend much on insurance. On 
the other hand, fully removing the tax exclusion raises almost three times as 
much revenue. Thus, as the tax cap is tightened, there will be smaller marginal 
gains in terms of reducing  “overinsurance,” but larger gains in terms of rev- 
enues. 
The estimates in table 5.6 assume that the price elasticity of demand for 
health insurance is -0.5.  This is not a behavioral parameter that commands a 
strong empirical consensus, so we also present estimates of the change in in- 
surance demand and the mix of increased revenues for two alternative elasticity 
estimates: -0.2  and -  1  .O. Table 5.7 presents these results. With a price elastic- 
ity of -  1  .O, we find that eliminating the tax exclusion for employer-provided 
insurance results in a decline of $2,609 in the quantity of insurance purchased, 
which is a 61 percent reduction. With a elasticity of -0.2,  not surprisingly, the 
quantity adjustment is much smaller and corresponds to approximately a 10 
percent decline in the value of employer-provided insurance. Whether this en- 
tire reduction in employer-provided insurance translates into a greater share of 
medical care being purchased on an out-of-pocket basis depends on whether 
individuals replace some employer-provided insurance with directly purchased 
insurance, an issue that we have not yet explored. 
The source of increased revenue, whether taxation of insurance premia or 
taxation of higher wages, also is sensitive to our assumed elasticity. Using the 
elasticity of -  1  .O,  more than half of the new revenue generated from eliminat- 
ing the tax subsidy comes from taxing wages, while with an elasticity of -0.2, 
almost 90 percent of the revenue comes from the tax on insurance benefits. As 
we noted earlier, the total revenue collected is not sensitive to our elasticity 
assumptions, only the decomposition across revenue sources. 
We have also explored the sources of increased revenues under our tax cap 
28. There is one reason to suspect that our results may underestimate the change in taxes from 
tax caps. We  calculate the revenue effects of  taxing health insurance spending by  multiplying 
changes in taxable income by the taxpayer’s current marginal tax rate, ignoring any movements 
across tax brackets that might result from taxation of employer-provided insurance. Since the tax 
code is progressive, this should lead our calculations to underestimate the actual revenue gain. 160  Jonathan Gruber and James M. Poterba 
Table 5.7  Sensitivity of Results on Capping Employer-Provided Health Insurance 
Deduction to Assumptions about Price Elasticities of Insurance Demand 
Level of Tax Caps (1994 $): 
Joint FildSingle Filer/Household Head 
8000/3200/6800  4000/1600/3400  2000/800/1700  0/0/0 
Changes in insurance demand 
Average change in E 
Average change in E if a change 
Tax increase per insured employeea 
Tax on insurance benefits 
Tax on higher wages 
Changes in insurance demand 
Average change in E 
Average change in E if a change 
Tax increase per insured employee“ 
Tax on insurance benefits 
Tax on higher wages 
Elasticity= -1.0 
-383  -  1,437 
-2,654  -2,320 
1.9  26.7 
146.2  538.0 
Elasticity= -0.2 
-  156  -437 
-  1,083  -706 
86.6  398.1 
61.5  166.6 
-2,318  ~ 












-  544 
1,364.1 
198.1 
Notes: Revenue effects on wage taxes assume that wages rise by  the full amount of any reduction in 
employer-provided insurance. See text for further details. 
dollars. 
plans. For our base case plan (4000/1600/3400), approximately 56 percent of 
the revenues raised are federal income tax revenues. Another 33 percent are 
raised by the social security and Medicare taxes, with the remaining 11 percent 
being raised by state taxes. The distribution is very similar for alternative tax 
caps. 
One final aspect of taxing employer-provided health insurance that our data 
can inform concerns the distribution of binding tax caps across income classes. 
Table 5.8 presents summary statistics on this issue. Each column corresponds 
to a different set of tax caps, from the previous  tables, but now the entries 
show the fraction of NMES families in a given income category that would be 
constrained by each cap. For our base case 4000/1600/3400 cap in column (2), 
for example, the table shows that the cap would bind for 27.1 percent of  the 
families with incomes between $10,000 and $20,000, compared with 67.8 per- 
cent of those with incomes between $75,000 and $100,000. The sample sizes 
for high-income groups in the NMES are relatively small, but the results at 
least illustrate the general pattern  across income classes. All of  the tax caps 
except  the  highest  are binding  for the  majority  of  HIUs  by  approximately 
$35,000 in family income; removing the tax exclusion entirely binds for the 
majority of families with more than $10,000 of income.29 
29. One potentially puzzling feature of table 5.8 is the failure to observe “100 percent” for each 
of the entries in col. (4) of  panel B. This disparity arises because there are some NMES respon- 161  Employer-Provided Health Insurance 
Table 5.8  Distribution of Binding Tax Caps by Family Income Class 
Level of Tax Caps (1994 $): Joint Filers/Single Filers/Household Heads 
AGI Class  8000/3200/6800  4000/1600/3400  2000/800/1700  O/O/O 



















A. All Persons 
3.4  17.9 
5.9  27.1 
10.4  47.6 
10.3  53.4 
13.0  59.9 
14.2  63.0 
19.9  67.8 
19.0  66.4 
11.8  51.1 
9.9  53.2 
10.9  50.0 
13.0  59.0 
11.5  59.8 
13.6  63.1 
14.6  64.6 
20.6  70.3 
19.3  67.5 
14.4  62.2 





































Source; Authors’ calculations using 1987 NMES data. Each entry shows the percentage of em- 
ployed individuals who would be affected by tax caps of the magnitudes indicated. Results in col. 
(4) of panel B are not equal to 100.0 because there are 18  1 Nh4ES respondents reporting employer- 
provided insurance but no spending (E  = G = 0). 
The rising incidence of binding caps at higher income levels reflects both 
the rising probability of having employer-provided insurance at higher income 
levels and the rising value of average premiums conditional on such insurance. 
In order to separate these factors, panel B of table 5.8 repeats these calculations 
for those with insurance. Here we can see that all except the most generous tax 
caps bind for the  majority of  insured persons  at any income level, and the 
gradient with respect to income is much less steep. 
5.5  Conclusion 
Our analysis emphasizes two aspects of the current tax subsidy to employer- 
provided health insurance and presents new evidence on the economic effects 
dents who have employer-provided health insurance, but who report zero employer expenditure 
(E).  They do report positive out-of-pocket spending (G) on insurance, but given our assumption 
that only one-quarter of households with such expenditures make them on a pretax basis, even a 
zero tax cap does not bind for 75 percent of these households. 162  Jonathan Gruber and James M. Poterba 
of  various tax reforms. The conceptual points we emphasize suggest that the 
current  federal  tax  code subsidizes  employer-provided  insurance  less  than 
many previous analyses would suggest. This is because a substantial and grow- 
ing share of employees who receive employer-provided insurance must pay for 
part of this insurance with their own after-tax dollars, and because the tax code 
also provides a deduction for extreme medical expenses, thereby to some de- 
gree discouraging individuals from purchasing health insurance. Our empirical 
analysis of the effect of capping the value of employer-provided  health insur- 
ance that could be excluded from taxation, or eliminating the exclusion en- 
tirely, suggests that these reforms could have substantial effects on the level of 
employer-provided insurance. 
There are a number of  important issues associated with both the determi- 
nants of the level of employer-provided insurance and the effect of tax reforms 
on this  insurance that we have not addressed. One issue is the role of joint 
decision making in workplace benefits. We have not considered how to aggre- 
gate the heterogeneous changes in tax incentives for employer-provided insur- 
ance that would accompany many tax cap plans into decision rules for firms. 
We have also stopped short of asking whether changes in tax incentives would 
lead to different combinations of workers into firms or health insurance units. 
If  tax  reform  led  to  greater  heterogeneity  in  worker  tastes  for employer- 
provided health insurance, employers might respond by  offering larger menus 
of insurance policies. This could be important for revenue estimation and could 
also have welfare implications. 
A second important issue concerns general equilibrium effects in the health 
insurance markets. If a substantial number of currently insured workers decide 
not to purchase  insurance under some of the tax reforms we consider,  it is 
possible that the load factor facing those who remain in the insured pool may 
change. This could affect the demand for health insurance even by those who 
do not face tax caps. 
A third issue is modeling the appropriate demand response to changes in the 
tax price of insurance. We have assumed a constant elasticity demand function 
and applied this elasticity equally to “looser” and “tighter” caps. In fact, indi- 
viduals may be quite elastic with respect to insurance coverage on the margin, 
but less elastic when it comes to dropping their insurance entirely. Extending 
this analysis to consider a richer range of responses to different tax caps is an 
important step for future research. 
Finally, this paper represents a strictly positive exercise. We have not consid- 
ered any of the interesting normative issues surrounding the tax treatment of 
health insurance. One important argument for subsidizing workplace insurance 
is that workplace pooling, which is largely  exogenous to underlying health, 
avoids the classic adverse selection problems in individual insurance markets. 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) discuss the theoretical possibility  that private 
insurance markets may fail, but there is little empirical evidence on the extent 
of  such failures  and their  welfare consequences.  Such  an  argument  would 163  Employer-Provided  Health Insurance 
imply welfare losses if the removal of  this tax subsidy led to the breakup of 
workplace pools. What is not clear, however, is the extent to which the tax 
subsidy, as opposed to other gains from pooling, is responsible  for holding 
workplace pools together. If  they can be measured, these pooling gains must 
be weighed against the distortions from excess consumption of medical care 
in deciding on the optimal level of tax subsidies. 
More generally, the question of whether private insurance purchases should 
be subsidized depends on a host of  unresolved issues, such as the degree to 
which uninsured individuals consume uncompensated care, how the costs of 
such care are shifted to paying health care consumers, the role of health insur- 
ance in affecting labor market behavior, and the other positive and negative 
externalities that a more-insured  population may provide. All of  these issues 
require further investigation. 
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Comment  David F. Bradford 
This paper presents measurements of the incentive effected by  tax rules for 
employers to provide health insurance benefits to their employees. The prob- 
lem poses conceptual and empirical challenges. The bulk of the work of the 
paper describes the methods by which the authors tease quantitative estimates 
of  average subsidy rates out of, mainly, two disparate data sources (the Na- 
tional  Medical  Expenditure  Survey  and  the  U.S.  Treasury  Individual  Tax 
Model file). But I propose to focus my comments on the conceptual side of 
the story. 
I hope that my taking up conceptual issues is not taken to imply a lack of 
appreciation for the ingenuity and perseverance that the authors have devoted 
to the quantitative estimates. It is an extraordinary job, taking into account a 
great many fine points of the data sets and institutional setting. 
The principal conceptual issues I would raise relate to the interpretation of 
the empirical work. The authors describe their analysis as limited to the ques- 
tion of the determination of how the tax system influences the division between 
employer-provided payments and out-of-pocket outlays by the employee in fi- 
nancing a given package of health care services. The distinction is made be- 
tween this problem and that of determining the impact of the tax system on the 
level of health care services demanded. It is taken for granted that, from the 
perspective of the employee, the payments by the employer take the form of 
insurance, whereas the own out-of-pocket payments constitute the lack of in- 
surance coverage that we describe as self-insurance. 
The critical distinction drawn in this paper, then, is not between subsidized 
health care and unsubsidized health care, but between health care covered by 
insurance and that not covered by insurance. Although a richer set of variations 
is recognized in the analysis of policy experiments, the basic analysis seems 
to treat “covered by insurance” as a zero-one variable. Either one is covered by 
an employer-sponsored plan or one is self-insured. 
Presumably, the reason for being interested in this distinction is the moral 
hazard associated with insurance: Put simply, a person covered by insurance 
has insufficient incentive to economize on health care services. Moral hazard 
is of  particular  importance in the case of  health care coverage because the 
insured-against event has a large subjective element. One can usefully think of 
moral hazard as arising under health insurance  at two points: First, if I am 
insured, my incentive is reduced to preserve my health by, for example, eating 
well and exercising regularly. Second, as typically structured (and it, perhaps, 
need not be so), health insurance alters my incentive to economize on the ser- 
vices deployed to deal with health problems that arise. Having concluded that 
I am sick, I have the option of a large range of treatments, ranging from letting 
David E Bradford is professor of economics and public affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School 
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nature take its course to consulting a world-famous specialist. Insurance re- 
duces,  perhaps  to zero, the  marginal  cost of  choosing  relatively  expensive 
methods of dealing with any given health problem. I would guess that the sec- 
ond sort of moral hazard is the far more serious problem quantitatively. 
If, in addition to subsidizing expenditures  on health care, the tax  system 
induces people to be covered by  insurance, there is an “extra moral hazard” 
cost imposed  on top of  the usual  deadweight loss. The authors discuss this 
overinsurance effect in connection with their simulation of the impact of vari- 
ous caps on employer-provided health care allowed to be excluded from the 
employee’s taxable income. 
I find myself in some doubt about the adequacy of the implicit model of 
insurance market equilibrium employed in the paper.  (I use the term “some 
doubt” advisedly, given the complexity of the market and the needed analysis.) 
First, as to the effect of a subsidy on the terms of insurance. Private insur- 
ance contracts may involve any of a variety  of methods of  internalizing the 
moral hazard problem. Classic approaches are to specify a deductible amount 
(so as to eliminate the moral hazard in the choice of service level in situations 
in which the loss to the insured is relatively small) and co-insurance rate (so 
that  the extra cost to the insured of choosing expensive treatment  is raised 
above zero). Other methods include monitoring and regulation by the insurance 
company, to reward my choice of a healthy life-style, to limit my freedom to 
identify myself as sick, and to restrict my choice of  treatments according to 
some criterion of medical necessity. 
Economic theory predicts that such devices to moderate moral hazard will 
be equilibrium phenomena. That is, they will be chosen by mutual agreement 
between insured and insurer. The insured will accept the various limits on cov- 
erage in return for the saving on the cost of the insurance. The saving will be 
greater than the expected cost of “necessary” treatment that will be borne by 
the insured, because the insured will have an incentive (or be obliged by  the 
monitoring regime) to limit treatment to what really is necessary (as distinct 
from what would be chosen if there were no limit or cost to the insured). 
A second classic problem of insurance is udverse selection. The possibility 
of adverse selection is due to asymmetric information, whereby I know I am at 
high risk of incurring health care expenses, but the insurance company cannot 
observe this fact. If insurance is priced to break even with average risks, I will 
tend to choose relatively extensive insurance coverage. The insurance company 
will then lose money. Adverse selection problems can also arise as a result of 
regulatory requirements that limit the ability of  insurance companies to vary 
the premium charged according to the health  characteristics of the insured. 
Adverse selection seems a likely explanation for the often-noted high loading 
and limited availability of individual health insurance policies. 
The devices to deal with adverse selection include physical  exams, limits 
on preexisting coverage, and similar techniques to break into the information 
advantage of potential insureds. These measures can be costly. An important 167  Employer-Provided Health Insurance 
technique that economizes on such underwriting procedures is to bundle the 
offering  of  insurance  with  some  other  choice that  is  likely  to  dominate 
the insurance in importance. The choice of employment is a prime example. 
(The point is recognized by the authors.) The fact that a particular employer 
offers a particular health insurance plan is not very likely to play a large role 
in the determination of  who will become an employee. To the extent this is 
true, employers can offer health insurance on terms that may be better than 
those obtainable by employees in a private, individual insurance market. Other 
features of the terms of employment may also present opportunities to mitigate 
adverse selection. For example, good health benefits may attract high health 
risks, but putting a substantial part of the compensation in the form of retire- 
ment annuities will deter those who do not expect to live long.’ 
Thus,  economic  theory  gives  us  grounds  to expect  that  employer-based 
health insurance would be observed in unregulated equilibrium, even without 
any tax incentives. If I approach this analysis with the expectation that (1) most 
people are going to prefer some insurance coverage to self-insurance and (2) 
employer-based plans are very likely to be common even in the absence of a 
subsidy, it seems to me that I am led to a different interpretation of the results. 
To isolate the point (and I cannot hope to settle it), imagine that employer- 
based insurance (or something economically  equivalent) is exactly what we 
would predict in the absence of a tax subsidy. Then the subsidy rates developed 
by the authors are, as a first approximation, those that apply to the purchase of 
health care, and only secondarily to the characteristics of the insurance con- 
tract involved. 
To make this point clearer, I have played devil’s advocate with my tax lawyer 
colleagues, asking whether I could write a contract with my employer with the 
following terms: I will take my pay in the form of health care services to be 
purchased by my employer as needed, as determined by me, subject to the IRS 
rules about what constitutes health care. If (as I hope and expect) the employ- 
er’s outlays fall short of a specific level (my current salary) the employer will 
make up the difference in cash. The income tax law makes explicit provision 
for the exclusion from the employee’s taxable income of health care services 
supplied by the employer. If the plan I described to my lawyer friends were 
feasible from the standpoint of the tax law, it would leave me in the position of 
obtaining the full advantage of the exclusion of health care benefits from tax, 
but without any insurance beyond the implicit insurance provided by the tax 
rate. (Even that might be eliminated if we worked out that the cash settlement 
varied by  more than the  employer’s outlays.)  But  you would not be able to 
observe this fact from data on employee health care outlays. 
There are two problems. First, my lawyers have pretty well convinced me 
that my plan would not work. Second, who would want such a plan? There 
1. Sherry Clied, who pointed this out to me, suggests that the empirical magnitudes make this 
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may, however, be schemes as yet undiscovered that would move a good dis- 
tance in the direction I described (such as a commitment to experience rating 
of my coverage) and that would pass legal muster. This question deserves in- 
vestigation, with due cognizance of  the second point: The choice is not be- 
tween no insurance and full insurance. The question is how much, if any, excess 
moral hazard is induced by the tax law. My suspicion is, a lot, but I think the 
exploration of this question requires a closer modeling of the specifics of the 
insurance plans than has yet been addressed by the authors. 
There is a second point at which I think the analysis would benefit from 
greater attention to the characteristics of equilibrium insurance contracts. It is 
assumed in the paper (and by most analysis of this issue) that one could admin- 
ister a cap on employer-provided health insurance, with insurance in excess of 
the cap to be taxed as wages to the employee. Insurance market considerations 
suggest two possibilities that may merit closer analysis: First, to the extent that 
the employer-provided insurance is similar in anti-moral-hazard characteristics 
to what would be predicted in the absence of tax subsidy, we would expect the 
insurance equilibrium to be, not the locus of adjustment to the change in the 
rules, but rather the amount of health care services purchased. Second, since 
the implicit insurance policy provided to an employee depends greatly on the 
characteristics of the employee (coverage of  an older person, e.g., is predict- 
ably much more costly than coverage of a younger person), and on the pool of 
employees in a plan  (those in a firm with  many old people, or many sick 
people, will face a higher average premium), it seems to me seriously doubtful 
that simple caps, taking no account of  such differences in characteristics (let 
alone preferences), would constitute viable tools in practice. 